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Abstract
Conservative geopolitics has assumed that the primary agents that matter in world 
affairs are states and, furthermore, that the primary relations that structure the 
world are those of force. Progressive geopolitics needs to question both assumptions.
In this article, I explore some of the things that matter other than states and some 
of the relations that count other than force.
Introduction
Geopolitics developed as an adjunct to statecraft and has focused primarily 
on states and on their use of force against each other. Teggart (1919) 
referred to the connection with favour in ‘Geography as an Aid to Statecraft’,
his appreciation of Mackinder’s (1919) famous volume of advice for the 
Versailles Peace Conference. From the Olympian heights of political science,
Clokie (1944, 502), reviewing among other things a reprint of Mackinder’s
book, disparaged geopolitics as, ‘[a]t best [. . .] no more than statecraft, 
with emphasis on the craft.’ Lacoste (2005, 6), for one, defines geopolitics 
as ‘the territorial struggle of powers’.1 Geopolitical theory has developed 
through reflection on the problems of state competition and, in this 
respect, geopolitics shares much with realist versions of international relations
theory. Morgenthau (1993, 5) presents politics as the pursuit of ‘interest 
in terms of power’. International politics, for him, comprehends the pursuit
of self-interest by states in competition with other states, in a context 
where there is no overall constraining structure. Unlike domestic politics, 
then, shaped by national law and legitimacy, international politics is an 
anarchic world devoid of consensual and enforceable law. For realists, 
international relations theory need address little beyond how and with 
what consequences states use force against each other.
Realists sometimes acknowledge that this is a bleak view of the world. 
Mearsheimer (2001), for example, writes of The Tragedy of Great Power
Politics. Recalling Thatcher’s claim that ‘there is no alternative’ (TINA) to 
capitalism (Bateman 2002), there is a strong whiff of TINA about this 
perspective. This view of the world promises to naturalise the gross power 
inequalities and exploitation of imperialism (Kearns 2006). In this sense, © 2008 The Author
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national relations and traditional geopolitics, as a form of conservative 
geopolitics. In other words, these approaches accept, with more or less 
regret, the unfairness of the world as it presents itself and conceive no way 
to imagine it shaped more equitably. On this perspective, the best that can 
be expected is that the global hegemon should for its own whimsical 
reasons choose to use its force to impose freedom.
There are theoretical and practical ways that we might try to develop 
a progressive geopolitics. The first would be through a critique of existing 
theory and the other would be by redirecting our attention towards 
neglected practices, and critical geopolitics is now well established at least 
in the first of these respects. Its focus has been discourse, ‘problematizing 
the production and use of [geopolitical] knowledge in various orders of 
power and space’ (Dalby and Ó Tuathail 1996, 451). Discourse, of course, 
is much broader than texts (Müller 2008) and includes those institutions 
through which particular ways of conceptualising the world produce their 
effects. Ó Tuathail (1994, 526) insists that critical geopolitics ‘is problematizing
how geographical discourse and systems of power work through each 
other to project maps of global politics with familiar centers and foreign 
peripheries, core identities and marginal spaces, tame regions and wild 
zones.’ Nevertheless, and despite reference to the importance of geopolitical
‘sites’ (Ó Tuathail 1994, 536), much of this work is in fact about texts. 
In the main, this work has drawn attention to the tropes of geopolitical 
arguments, both to undermine the self-evidential way that these metaphors
and framings sustain geopolitical projects that should be contested, and to 
deconstruct the tropes themselves by showing that they can never bear the 
weight placed on them. The majority of writings on critical geopolitics 
concern the discourses produced by, about, or for, the most powerful 
agents in the geopolitical world order (though, see Dalby 1999).
There are certainly works of progressive geopolitics that move beyond 
texts and imagery, and describe explicitly the violence of states. Indeed, 
it is in linking states and violence that some of the most critical work in 
geopolitics has been produced. Gregory’s (2004) work on violence within 
Iraq, Afghanistan and Israel/Palestine is exemplary (see also Gregory and 
Pred 2007). Oslender (2004) has likewise studied the violence visited on 
black communities of Colombia’s Pacific coast and in his study of the 
resistance of this social movement he has noted that an indigenous sense 
of place in terms of an ‘aquatic space’ is at the heart of their organising 
against the hegemonic scale of the state. Nevins (2003), in rejecting 
understandings of the state that treat it only in terms of the logic of capital 
accumulation (Purcell and Nevins 2005), highlights instead the structural 
violence that most forms of nation-building exclude from their commitment
to truth and reconciliation. This is only a sampling of a rich literature in 
what, following Benhabib (1986), we might term the moment of critique. 
I think that this critical work is vital but I think that it needs to be © 2008 The Author Geography Compass 2/5 (2008): 1599–1620, 10.1111/j.1749-8198.2008.00125.x
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In other words, we need to be attentive to the possibilities of progressive 
change and that is not best achieved by contemplating only the constraints 
of the present; in this case, the violent relations between states.
There are indeed more things than are dreamt of in the philosophy of 
either conservative geopolitics or the realist theory of international relations.
In simple terms, there are more things than states and there are more 
relations than those of force. Furthermore, this is where may be found 
some of the progressive possibilities of the present, non-states and non-
violence play a significant role in shaping the modern world order. This 
has been understood within feminist critiques of geopolitics, as when 
Gilmartin and Kofman (2004, 122) bemoan the ‘non-gendering of 
geopolitics’ and highlight the exclusive emphasis of geopolitics on state 
elites. In a review of the relations between feminism and geopolitics, 
Hyndman (2004, 308) identifies the same statecentrism, suggesting that 
‘[w]hile the state remains a vital subject of interrogation in relation to 
security, it obscures fear and violence at other scales beyond its purview.’ 
There is already a critique of state-centrism in political geography from 
scholars developing Wallerstein’s world-systems perspective (Taylor 2000). 
Various theorists of globalisation have likewise suggested that the significance
of the state and the state system is today somewhat reduced (Brenner 
1999; Falk 1997). I am reluctant to reduce this to a question of scale, and 
want instead to think about some of the agents other than states, and 
agencies other than violence that matter, without placing the state as a 
stable scale between local and global. In other words, the agents I am 
interested in operate in a series of contexts both above and below the 
state. Elsewhere (Kearns forthcoming, Chapter 9) I attempt a sketch of 
the political economy with which these agents and agencies engage, but 
I hope it is clear in what follows that the agents with which I deal deploy 
political and economic power consubstantially. Similarly, the agencies of 
non-violence, solidarity and justice that are described here always run up 
not only against the explicit violence of state and other agents that pursue 
the interests of the rich and powerful, but also against the implicit structural
violence of an inequality that renders too many livelihoods vulnerable 
while leaving too few living in ease (for a discussion of the ‘vital’ perspective,
see Kearns and Reid-Henry forthcoming).
States and Non-States
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS
There are a range of non-state entities that matter in global geopolitics. 
At the very least, we must acknowledge transnational corporations 
(TNC), non-governmental organisations (NGO), regional alliances of 
states, and multilateral agencies. Part of the difficulty with geopolitics, at © 2008 The Author Geography Compass 2/5 (2008): 1599–1620, 10.1111/j.1749-8198.2008.00125.x
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in economic terms are not often also treated in political terms. For example, 
there is a great deal of work on the dialectic between the local and global 
in the economic practices and impacts of TNCs. Geographers have made 
important contributions to the debate about globalisation, considering 
such questions as whether firms are still nationally rooted in any significant
manner (Dicken 2003)? There is also a good deal of work on whether 
under pressure of globalisation, states are losing control over their national 
economies, leading some to write of an Unruly World (Herod et al. 1998), 
a global economic system no longer ordered tightly by a network of states. 
I am not persuaded that globalisation is a useful way to conceptualise 
the agency of TNCs. In the first place, TNCs are not new and yet 
globalisation is presented as a novelty. Theorists too easily hypostasise the 
supposed intensification of international capital mobility as a process in its 
own right independently of the agency of TNCs. In this way, ‘globalisation’, 
itself, as Agnew and Corbridge (1995) point out, serves the ideological 
function of sustaining neoliberal economic choices by allowing theorists 
to argue that in this newly globalised world, choices that were available 
to states in former times are no longer on the table.
There is a need to theorise the agency of TNCs more explicitly. For 
example, Ietto-Gillies (2002a) offers a helpful sketch of the decisions 
behind the location decisions of TNCs. Thus, TNCs must decide 
between, on one hand, exporting goods produced at home and, on the 
other hand, both producing and selling in overseas markets. In making 
this choice, they may be influenced by state or multistate regulatory 
regimes (notably tariffs) that would favour production abroad and also by 
the use of foreign production as a learning strategy, tapping into foreign 
technology and management systems. TNCs must also choose between 
including all stages within their own company in comparison to outsourcing
some stages to other companies, again either at home or abroad. Finally, 
TNCs must choose whether to invest in many countries or only in a few. 
Ietto-Gillies goes on to suggest that the spread of cross-border activity 
within companies has been influenced both by the increasing financialisation
of economic activity and by the development of new information and 
communications technologies. The first makes investment less stable and 
the second makes the integration of activity across space more straightforward. 
Together, they produce an intensification of the frequency and volume of 
flows of foreign direct investment. This research agenda, though, is rather 
difficult to operationalise. When it comes to the empirical study of firms, 
Ietto-Gillies (2002b) relies on two indices: an index of internationalisation 
(the number of a company’s affiliates and subsidiaries that are located 
abroad divided by the number located at home) and an index of network 
spread (the number of countries in which subsidiaries are located divided 
by the number of foreign countries accepting foreign direct investment). 
For five dates in the period 1963–1997, Ietto-Gillies calculates these© 2008 The Author Geography Compass 2/5 (2008): 1599–1620, 10.1111/j.1749-8198.2008.00125.x
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manufacturing or mining companies. The agency of TNCs is described 
but not observed in such an analysis.
Even in these abstract terms, this is, from a geopolitical perspective, a 
rather narrow understanding of the agency of TNCs, particularly when it 
comes to such powerful players as the largest extractive and manufacturing 
companies. The explicit separation of political context from economic 
decision is unrealistic. The largest companies have repeatedly acted in 
directly political fashion. There has been, and continues to be, a close 
relation between national foreign policy and the promotion of national 
businesses. In the case of the oil companies, for example, British policy 
in the countries of the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Basin has been 
supportive to the extent of direct collusion. Thus, the territorial arrange-
ments imposed on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire after World War
I were organised around securing Anglo-Persian a monopoly in the oilfields 
of Persia (Sluglett 1976). The British government had purchased 51% of 
this company at the start of the war. Yergin (1991) shows the similar ways 
that the overseas interests of Standard Oil were promoted by the US 
government. The process continues today, of course, with countries such as 
the USA, China, Russia, France and Britain all competing to secure 
drilling concessions for their own national oil companies in both these 
well-established oilfields (Kleveman 2003) and in other places such as 
Sudan and Nigeria. So important are these resource wars (Klare 2001) that 
it is in this context that the term geopolitics came back into common use after
the avoidance of the term in the decades following the Nazi appropriation 
of the term (Kearns forthcoming).
These close associations are clear not only in the case of oil. In 1954, 
the military intervention in Guatemala by the USA was prompted by the 
nationalisation, with compensation, of a US company, United Fruit 
(Schlesinger and Kinzer 1982). The privatisation of natural resources that 
Harvey (2003) has termed accumulation by dispossession, may have been 
imposed on many countries as part of structural adjustment policies, but 
it was particular companies, such as Rio Tinto Zinc (Moody 1996), that 
cultivated the political links to leave them well placed to buy these 
resources. In other words, it is by acting politically that companies pursue 
economic opportunity, by being an integral part of international relations 
that they act economically. My point is that this dimension of geopolitics 
can only be understood by theorising the conjoint agency of governments 
and TNCs. TNCs extend the agency of states, and vice versa (Hirst 2005).
In other words, the agency of TNCs must include their cooperation 
with governments. At one level, this is revealed by lobbying and campaign 
financing. In the US 2001-2 electoral cycle, the 86 largest US companies 
accounted for about 5% of all electoral contributions that passed through 
political action committees (Anderson and Cavanagh 2004, 7; Center for 
Responsive Politics 2007). The US government now incorporates ever © 2008 The Author Geography Compass 2/5 (2008): 1599–1620, 10.1111/j.1749-8198.2008.00125.x
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agreements. Beyond this, there is, in the USA, such a privatisation of 
government activities that Klein (2007) speaks of extensive corporatism. Taxes
are raised publicly but they are spent, increasingly, not through agencies 
that are part of government, but by commissioning services from private 
companies, in fields as diverse as education and the military. This corporatism
is an important aspect of geopolitics. States act, in part, through, with, and
on behalf of TNCs. TNCs are political and not just economic agents.
In very important ways, then, TNCs can be agents of imperialism. In 
this respect, understanding their agency contributes to an understanding 
of how global inequities are reproduced. There is, however, another side 
to the operation of TNCs that might attract the attention of people 
wishing to theorise the prospects for a fairer world. Because TNCs do 
business in many countries, legal and consumer pressure in one place can 
be used to address the responsibilities of the company towards people in 
another. For example, revived for use in the 1980s was an Alien Tort 
Claims Act passed by the very first US Congress in 1789. This ‘provides 
federal courts with jurisdiction over violations of the “law of nations”’ 
(Collingworth 2003, 1). If corporations can be shown to have knowingly 
employed people under conditions of slavery, or where torture, murder or 
rape are used as forms of labour discipline, then, they are complicit in 
those actions. In 1992, Unocal and Total, a US and a French oil company, 
engaged with the government of Burma to have a natural gas pipeline 
built for them. Despite warnings about the nature of labour relations 
under the Burmese junta, the companies went ahead. Unocal and Total 
employed the Burmese army as their security services on the project, 
which was completed in 1998. Workers were kidnapped from villages, and 
where workers were recaptured after escape they were tortured, as a 
warning to others. Both the International Labor Rights Fund and the 
Center for Constitution Rights took up the case of Burmese villagers in 
US courts, first in California, and then, invoking the parallel with the 
prosecution of companies that knowingly benefited from subsidiaries that 
employed slave labour in Nazi Germany, the case was remanded to federal 
district court for trial. In 2005, Unocal settled out of court (Rosencranz 
and Louk 2005).
The transnational nature of these companies can be a way of making 
them a vehicle for mitigating the imperialist purpose they more generally 
serve. It is true, as Jochnick (1999) notes, that it is difficult for poor 
countries to regulate TNCs, which exceed in annual earnings the gross 
domestic product of many such countries. Chesterman (2004) is likewise 
sceptical about the prospects for using the national law of the home 
country of the TNC to prosecute for human rights abuses committed 
abroad. Chesterman cites the case of ExxonMobil’s activities in Aceh, 
Indonesia, where the US State Department prevented a case proceeding 
through the US courts because US interests might be harmed; Indonesia © 2008 The Author Geography Compass 2/5 (2008): 1599–1620, 10.1111/j.1749-8198.2008.00125.x
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military junta stand isolated as a pariah state, and this means that they get 
no help of this kind. Chesterman sees more potential in voluntary codes 
of conduct such as the Global Compact, initiated by the Union Nations 
(UN) in 1999. Because, in any case, international law exists largely as a 
consensual system, the use of codes and compacts to embarrass TNCs is 
perhaps as good way as any to develop international compliance. This 
means that when it comes to regulating human rights aspects of TNC 
operations, the state ‘is increasingly supplanted by sub-state and supra-state 
normative regimes’ (Engle 2004, 106). O’Rourke (2003, 3) argues that 
NGO regulation of TNC labour practices ‘can be effective [. . .] when 
monitoring and remediation are technically rigorous, publicly transparent, 
politically legitimate, and accountable to key stakeholders (in particular to 
workers and consumers).’ Explicitly rejecting TINA, Ruggie (2002, 28) 
suggests that there will be a backlash against globalisation unless it can 
cultivate ‘popular roots and social legitimacy’, and that this requires that 
TNCs should be able to label themselves as responsible producers and 
ethical employers (Diller 1999).
In this respect, it is, of course, only public pressure and exposure that 
will counter the irresponsibility that is the very purpose of outsourcing. 
Recently, the demonstration that child labour was impressed by one of its 
subsidiaries produced this concession:
Gap said it was unaware that clothing intended for the Christmas market had 
been improperly subcontracted to a sweatshop using child labour. It announced 
it had withdrawn the garments involved while it investigated breaches of the 
ethical code imposed by it three years ago. (McDougall 2007)
Such ethical codes result from the public finding it unacceptable that 
conditions of work should be set solely by the market and recall Marx’s 
(1993 [1864], 79) endorsement of the British Ten Hours’ Act (1847) as ‘the 
victory of a principle; it was the first time that in broad daylight the 
political economy of the middle class succumbed to the political economy 
of the working class.’ The bourgeois belief in ‘the blind rule of [. . .] 
supply and demand’ now met the working class advocacy of ‘social 
production controlled by social foresight’. It might be depressing that the 
19th-century struggles over working conditions return on a global scale 
but regulation, inspection and moral pressure remain forces for progressive 
change in countering slavery (Bales 2005), child labour (Seabrook 2001), 
and unsafe workplaces (International Labour Office 2007). Geographers 
show a growing, and critical, engagement with these issues (Barnett et al. 
2005; Hale and Opondo 2005; Hughes 2001; Klooster 2006; Malpass 
et al. 2007; Sadler 2004). It is evident from these and other studies that 
there is progressive potential in regulating TNCs and that this potential is 
more easily realised where there is: monitoring by NGOs, the formulation 
of international law, and solidaristic pressure for change.© 2008 The Author Geography Compass 2/5 (2008): 1599–1620, 10.1111/j.1749-8198.2008.00125.x
Journal Compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
1606 Progressive geopoliticsNON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS
There is, again, relatively little work in geography on the geopolitical 
significance of NGOs. There have been some studies of their promotion 
of economic, social and political development in poorer countries (McIlwaine 
1998; Mercer 2002). Sundberg (1998) writes of the transformation of 
society by NGOs, in both intended and unintended ways, as the creation 
of NGO landscapes. Others have questioned the extent to which NGO 
activity regulates rather than empowers the poor (Townsend et al. 2002). 
Although Mohan (2002) is right to stress the transnational nature of many 
NGOs (which is why they are relevant to the study of global geopolitics), 
it remains the case that they usually recruit their senior staff and declare 
their profits in some home countries. In many ways, they replicate the 
questions raised by studies of the effects of globalisation on TNCs. NGOs 
likewise operate by forming relations with various states and with various 
other multilateral institutions. However, in seeking to understand the 
agency of NGOs, we are helped by the fact that they are good deal more 
open about what they do than are TNCs.
In a very useful review of development NGOs, Bebbington (2004) 
stresses their network nature. NGOs connect people in different places. This
can have consequences, either economically, in introducing rural producers
to new ‘fair trade’ international markets, or politically, in deploying inter-
national solidarity to draw attention to unjust conditions in particular 
localities, as is the regular achievement of Amnesty International. Indeed, it 
is difficult to underestimate the significance of Amnesty International (Clark 
2001) and Human Rights Watch in cultivating a more general sensibility 
about international human rights through their campaigns on behalf of 
those abused by torture or unfair imprisonment. Taylor (2004, 270) maps 
NGO activity to show that, rather than replicating the ‘Western’ bias of 
their headquarters, NGO activity is concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa, 
and, in this way, ‘their global activities are providing a legitimising 
platform for dissident and diverse voices from regions where economic 
and political power is lacking.’ McFarlane (2006) identifies the agency of 
NGOs in shaping new, and more egalitarian, learning networks whereby 
understandings of globalisation no longer flow down from the Western 
academy to the Third World activist. A similar point about new geographies
of knowledge is made by Slater (2004), although the place of NGOs in 
this amplification of local knowledge is not Slater’s primary concern.
Non-governmental organisations have a complex relationship with 
sovereign states. Some NGOs, such as the International Red Cross/Crescent,
operate only with the explicit permission of the states claiming jurisdiction
over the territory in question. Others, notably Médecins Sans Frontières, 
recognise that in some circumstances states will deliberately deny international
aid access to parts of their country and thus to some of their subjects, 
particularly if the regions are involved in civil war. Debrix (1998) writes © 2008 The Author Geography Compass 2/5 (2008): 1599–1620, 10.1111/j.1749-8198.2008.00125.x
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under the exclusionary barriers of state sovereignty. In fact, however, 
Médecins Sans Frontières has found it very difficult to operate with safety 
in places where states forbid their presence and, with regard mainly to the 
safety of its local staff, has withdrawn from most states where its access is 
restricted by official decree (Redfield 2005, 2006; Terry 2002). Nevertheless,
NGOs have been at the heart of debates over humanitarian intervention 
of various kinds and Smith (1998, 76) suggests that ‘a state that is oppressive
and violates the autonomy and integrity of its subjects forfeits its moral 
claim to full sovereignty.’
MULTILATERAL AGENCIES
With the end of the Cold War, the UN seized the opportunity to discard 
the paralysis of not being able to involve itself in most parts of the world, 
claimed as clients by one of the two great powers (Traub 2006, 22). The 
principles of this renewed assertiveness on the part of the UN were 
human rights and global solidarity. Wheeler (2000, 12–13) suggests that 
this new position of humanitarian intervention acknowledged the con-
tingency of sovereignty with human rights abuses ‘morally entitling other 
states to use force to stop the oppression.’ Wheeler argues that the moral 
authority of the UN means that states now try to justify their use of force 
in terms of these human rights norms and that this places restrictions on 
what they can do, even if it does not restrain them as fully as the norms 
would imply.
There are very many problems with this strategy of forceful humanitarian
intervention. Very often, the UN does not have the troops to intervene 
with skill and efficiency. In one of the few geographical studies of peace-
keeping, Grundy-Warr (1994) concluded that peacekeeping would only 
work where the UN had the support of both parties in any civil war. This 
is perhaps a too despairing counsel. The refusal to take sides where crimes 
against humanity are involved produces an incapacity that hides behind 
neutrality, as in the failures in Bosnia, where, in fact, the British used the 
danger to their own troops in the UN peacekeeping force to defer the 
combination of air strikes and military support for Croats and Muslims 
that eventually stalled the project to create Greater Serbia (Simms 2001). 
Given the reluctance of contributing nations to put the troops they send 
peacekeeping in any sort of danger, attacking peacekeepers becomes, not 
a trigger for forceful retribution, but merely a way of clearing the field 
for more extensive violence, as happened in Rwanda in 1994, where the 
withdrawal of peacekeepers after the murders of Belgian soldiers, gave 
Hutu militias free-run to murder 800,000 Tutsis in about 100 days (Traub 
2006, 51).
In the middle of the Cold War, it was likely that such civil conflicts 
would be limited as a consequence of the affiliation of the warring parties © 2008 The Author Geography Compass 2/5 (2008): 1599–1620, 10.1111/j.1749-8198.2008.00125.x
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confrontation. The UN, at that time, was only able to act in those few 
instances where super-power interests were not in play because if they 
were a Security Council veto by one or other side was always sufficient 
to scotch intervention (Urquhart 2007). Rupert Smith (2005, 17) argues 
that it is time to recognise that the old model of what he terms ‘industrial 
war’ between states has been supplanted by what he terms ‘war among 
the people’. In this new species of conflict, non-state coalitions fight not 
in order to prevail but in order to create conditions under which a new 
political arrangement can be negotiated. Modern war is rarely fought 
through to conclusive victory because, argues Smith (2005, 358), these 
non-state coalitions fight in such a way as to ‘conserve the force’. The 
increasing privatisation of the US military, with the use of mercenaries 
(Scahill 2007) and of military service as expediting immigration (Bender 
2006; Meyer 2007), might reduce the political cost of military casualties, 
although the economic cost of training and equipping either mercenaries 
or foreign legions remains high.
This recent development of military humanitarian intervention has 
clearly changed the relations between force and states, and between states 
and multilateral institutions such as the UN and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a fairly 
steady decline in global violence (Gurr 2000; Harbom and Wallensteen 
2005; Marshall and Goldstone 2007). The Human Security Centre (2005, 
1) reports that ‘[b]etween 1991 [. . .] and 2004, 28 armed struggles for 
self-determination started or restarted, while 43 were contained or ended. 
There were just 25 armed secessionist conflicts under way in 2004, the 
lowest number since 1976.’ The report concludes that ‘[w]ith the Security 
Council no longer paralysed by Cold War politics, the UN spearheaded 
a veritable explosion of conflict prevention, peacemaking and post-conflict
peace-building activities in the early 1990s’ (Human Security Centre 
2005, 8). The major exception to this trend has been the persistent 
increase in what Marshall and Goldstone (2007, 5) term ‘high casualty 
terrorist bombings’ (HCBTs; at least 15 deaths). From 11 September 2001 
to 25 February 2007, there were 15,614 such deaths including the 2982 
who died in the USA from the attacks of 11 September 2001. There are 
six ‘high incidence states’. The USA has had no further HCBTs after 9/11.
Afghanistan (243 deaths), Israel (348), Pakistan (583) and Russia (1428) 
saw initial increases after 9/11 but by 2004 the only country with 
substantial and persistent HCBTs was Iraq (6650 deaths). By 2004, the 
civil war/insurgency in Iraq was the only example of international 
involvement in an internal conflict (Harbom and Wallensteen 2005, 629).
During the Cold War, multilateral institutions were more wary of state 
sovereignty than they have since become. Another clear example of this is
the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Developing out of the international
agreements that promoted freer trade between states, the WTO now seeks © 2008 The Author Geography Compass 2/5 (2008): 1599–1620, 10.1111/j.1749-8198.2008.00125.x
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longer content to reduce tariffs, at least for those states too weak to defy it, 
the WTO insists that states accept a common regulatory regime because all 
beyond this bare minimum is branded as ‘in restraint of trade’ (Wallach et al. 
2004). In other words, it is no longer acceptable that a state should treat 
imported goods and domestic goods in an even-handed manner, and they 
must now treat all according to the standards that the WTO presents as 
universal. The WTO now beats down not only tariff barriers but also 
domestic regulatory intent in a manner that seriously compromises state 
sovereignty. My argument, then, is that NGOs and multilateral institutions
are increasingly effective agents in inter-state relations. The former in 
many cases have the potential to enhance state capacities, while the latter 
are at risk of becoming little more than agents of Western imperialism. 
Indeed, the WTO is so unfair that most poorer countries would perhaps 
best serve their interests by derogating from its regulations.
Alongside the increased activity of transnational agencies of various 
kinds, there have developed transnational social movements. These are 
seen by some commentators as promising a new kind of global civil 
society (Wapner 1996). This new non-state political identity is produced 
more readily in those states that themselves respect international obligations
because residents of ‘[c]ountries with structured, routine participation in 
the global polity – measured in terms of memberships in international 
organizations and treaties – are more likely to become “socialized” into 
the norms of international society’ (Smith and Wiest 2005, 637).
Force and Non-Force
NON-VIOLENCE
Geography’s feet are caked with clay from the battlefield. Friedrich Ratzel’s
observation of 1897 that ‘[w]ar is the school of space’ (Mendieta 2006, 
208) registers that the territoriality of war both draws on and stimulates 
geographical research. The Franco-Prussian War (1870) was widely seen as
a triumph of German geographical training and was repeatedly invoked 
when people promoted geographical education in late 19th-century Britain.
Indeed, the New Geography of Mackinder and his allies was promoted 
in and through the British military (Hudson 1977; Stoddart 1992). After 
World War II, Eva Taylor (1948, 137) celebrated the ‘sudden rise of 
geographical prestige which occurs in war time.’ Around the end of the 
war, there were many studies, such as Spykman’s (1944) The Geography of 
the Peace, on what one reviewer termed the ‘wearisome frontier problems of
Europe’ (Steers 1948, 431; see, among many others, Dixon 1946; Peattie 
1944; Van Valkenburg 1946). Spykman (1942, 436) believed that the 
necessity for borders arose from the ‘great inequalities in military strength 
between states’ and Gottman (1951, 172) was sure that secure borders © 2008 The Author Geography Compass 2/5 (2008): 1599–1620, 10.1111/j.1749-8198.2008.00125.x
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through which people attempt to preserve their right to differentiate 
themselves from their neighbors.’ The units are assumed to be states (based 
on distinctive peoples) and their mutual relations are assumed to be hostile,
unless corralled by effective boundaries. These themes continue to charac-
terise much political geography (among many others, Corson and Minghi 
1996; Newman 1996; van der Wusten and O’Loughlin 1986). A major 
stimulus to the development of geographical information systems has also 
been its military applications (Corson and Palka 2004; Roberts and Schein 
1995; Smith 1992). Lacoste (1976) famously asserted that geography has 
been, primarily, about making war. Geographers, like Robert Frost’s 
(2002 [1914], l. 27) neighbour, seem to believe that ‘[g]ood fences make 
good neighbors.’ Perhaps, like Frost (2002, l. 1) with his neighbour, we might
yet try to insinuate among the geographers the notion that ‘[s]omething 
there is that doesn’t love a wall.’
If we never study anything but sovereign states we will never imagine, 
or understand, the circumstances under which sovereign states might 
choose to pool sovereignty, to attempt the ‘mischief ’ (Frost 2002, l. 28) 
of letting walls fall to ruin. If we never study anything but force, its 
emergence and containment, we will never imagine, or understand, how to
make peace in other ways; through pooling sovereignty (Duedney 2000) 
or pursuing justice (Dower 2002). We will be forced to accept O’Loughlin 
and van der Wusten’s (1986, 501) counsel of despair and focus on war and 
the ‘absence of war, or negative peace’. In his prospectus for political 
geography, O’Loughlin (1986) treats international relations solely in terms 
of war and conflict. Pepper and Jenkins (1983), in an unfortunately named 
peace manifesto, ‘A Call to Arms’, proposed a series of geographical 
research topics as a contribution to peace studies, and all were about 
understanding war. The emphasis of their edited collection, The Geography 
of Peace and War, is ‘on war rather than direct peace studies’ (Pepper 1985, 
3). Indeed, each of three collections about the geography of war and 
peace focuses in the main on war (Flint 2005a; Kliot and Waterman 1991; 
Pepper and Jenkins 1985). Not many have taken up the challenges thrown 
down by Bunge (1973) and Wisner (1986). There have been a few works 
on the geography of peace movements (Brunn 1985; Miller 2000; 
Pickerill and Webster 2006; Routledge 2003). There are also a few 
geographical studies of structural violence (Galtung 1969, 1996) as it 
imperils peace (McIlwaine 1999; Mustafa 2005; Watts 1983).
Force is tamed, not primarily by an equivalent counter-force, but by 
justice, legality and negotiation. Violence is a refusal to listen and it is thus 
inimical to truth. Cortright (2006) presents non-violent social action as a 
striving for truth. Vaclav Havel in communist Czechoslovakia emphasised 
the importance of establishing alternative institutions allowing people to live 
in truth (Schell 2003). In On Violence, Hannah Arendt (1969) drew a 
distinction between violence and power that helps explain why non-violence© 2008 The Author Geography Compass 2/5 (2008): 1599–1620, 10.1111/j.1749-8198.2008.00125.x
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together and such cooperation will best be secured by consent. The trust 
that allows cooperation is legitimated by a sense that society is fundamentally
just and is poisoned by flagrant injustice. Kurlansky (2006) documents the 
power of non-violence in a range of contexts from religious to independence
struggles. George (2004) insists that the anti-globalisation struggle has 
been effective precisely where it has imposed the discipline of non-
violence on its members. Fry (2007) reminds us that war is a recent 
development in human history, dating back only to the invention of 
agriculture and the emergence of states:
 [A]n overemphasis on violence, including warfare, by the dark-sided, demonic 
school of thought ignores and obscures how humans manage to live peacefully 
together most of the time. A more realistic perspective also takes into account 
restraints against violence, aggression prevention activities, non-violent conflict 
management techniques, and reconciliation strategies that humans regularly 
practice. (Fry 2007, 89)
Rather than being an unavoidable, pervasive and dominant aspect of 
international relations, force has been subject to significant check at 
various times. Peace has been made more often than war. The statist 
perspective and the obsession with force reinforce each other. Countering 
one undermines the other. Coercion is less effective than cooperation, 
although it often appears to offer a quicker solution. To build a just new 
world order, we need to develop and respect international law.
INTERNATIONAL LAW
There is now a broad literature on legal geography (Blomley 1994; 
Blomley et al. 2001; Holder and Harrison 2003). Very little of this literature
considers international law or takes up Hyndman’s (2000, 1) observation 
that international ‘[b]orders breed uneven geographies of power and status’
(but see, Buchanan 2001; Carmalt 2007). There are two principal bases 
for international human rights arguments. In the first place, we might 
invoke norms that are necessarily implied by the very existence of a social 
order (Moon 2003). The Kantian categorical imperative grounds morality 
in universal principles, which must hold, then, at all scales and it is on 
this basis that Habermas calls for a global commitment to republican 
principles. In the second place, we can acknowledge that by cooperating 
with others we are more productive than we would be without their 
assistance. On this basis, Hume suggested that we must share the benefits 
of cooperation with all those who lend their assistance. For this reason, 
Rawls argues that global justice implies not only political rights but also 
fairness in the distribution of wealth. There are clearly relations between 
these so-called (Vašák 1977) first-generation (civil and political) and 
so-called second-generation (social and economic) rights. In some © 2008 The Author Geography Compass 2/5 (2008): 1599–1620, 10.1111/j.1749-8198.2008.00125.x
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because people lack the resources to access the legal system. Nevertheless, 
it is true that, insofar as we can talk about effective international human 
rights, the negative rights of being free from unjust violence are more 
widely accepted than the positive rights of a just share in global wealth.
From a statist perspective, absent a global-state, international law is an 
oxymoron (Nagel 2005). Realist theories of international relations insist 
that the global system is anarchic because it necessarily lacks a central 
regulating authority (Mearsheimer 2001, 30). Yet, there are three ways 
that international law can be said to be meaningful. In the first place, 
states may choose to incorporate international regulations into national 
law. It might appear that this is volitional and that the international 
dimension has little independent force. However, institutions like the 
European Court of Human Rights often lead national opinion. The 
Court is a forum somewhat more detached from national public opinion 
than are national parliaments. In this calmer place, judgements are made 
that the 47 signatory states agree to respect even if it means changing 
national law (Moravcsik 2002). There are some disappointing derogations 
(as with UK’s insistence on being allowed to hold persons for 28, rather 
than four, days before bringing them before a judge to be charged). 
Nevertheless, the Court has given human rights a more effective voice 
across the continent of Europe. Such transnational institutions often give 
standing to more than just states. Not only may individuals bypass their 
state and appeal directly, but NGOs can also make representations. In this 
respect, these ‘settings are the focus of a transnational politics of movements
and organizations, and not only an intergovernmental politics between states’ 
(Cohen and Sabel 2006, 165). The transnational exists, then, not only as 
a legal space but also as one that incorporates more than mere sets of states.
The second way that international law can be said to be effective is 
where the community of states acts in accordance with its existence. 
Robertson (2006, 95–96) sets outs three stages in the establishment of an 
international human right. There are rights that governments feel obliged 
to claim that they respect (opinio juris). As these rights become part of the 
accepted rules of the community of states, no state is able to exempt itself 
( jus cogens). Finally, such rights are so well recognised that each state owes 
it to all other states to bring to justice violators of these rights that appear 
within their jurisdiction, regardless of whether the crime was committed 
there or somewhere else (erga omnes). There are, then, two ways such 
international laws can be effective. In the first place, a national court may 
hear a case against someone who has committed crimes against humanity. 
In this connection, the House of Lords agreed in October 1998 that 
Pinochet could be extradited to Spain because a Spanish court had issued a
warrant against him for directing a systematic campaign of torture in 
Chile. In the second place, the UN can set up ad hoc tribunals to prosecute
individuals for systematic (usually state-sanctioned) policies of genocide, © 2008 The Author Geography Compass 2/5 (2008): 1599–1620, 10.1111/j.1749-8198.2008.00125.x
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catastrophic failures, have subsequently seen the creation of courts of 
justice with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY; from 1993) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR; from 1994). In each, significant numbers of commanders and 
politicians have been indicted for atrocities. Robertson (2006) concludes 
of the ICTY that ‘its achievement in processing and punishing most of 
the persons responsible for commanding atrocities in the Balkans has been 
considerable’ (p. 405), and of the ICTR that it has ‘functioned in Africa 
to end the impunity of genocidal heavyweights – eleven government 
ministers and a swag of generals and colonels who would otherwise have 
gone unpunished’ (p. 409).
The third way that international law can function is as a source of 
paradigmatic jurisprudence. International human rights has been characterised
as placing individual rights above state rights. It is clear that a further 
development has been to place group rights above the force majeure of 
majoritarian democracy (Elster 1993). This development is perhaps largely 
responsible for the decline in ethnic violence over the past two decades. 
Based on a study of 300 ‘politically active ethnic and religious groups’ 
over the second half of the 20th century, Gurr (2000, 53) identifies the 
1990s as remarkably quiescent: ‘[b]y the late 1990s, the most common 
strategy among ethnic groups was not armed conflict but prosaic politics.’ 
From the early 1990s, European jurisprudence, as expressed through the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Council of 
Europe, shifted towards a greater concern with group aspects of human 
rights, particularly those relating to national minorities. Models for 
respecting minority rights were thus available for the new democracies of 
Eastern Europe. These examples also offered as an alternative to complete 
independence, realistic templates of regional autonomy to ethnic nationalist
movements outside Europe. The benefits of accommodation are thus 
made clearer to both sides in civil war.
International law, then, can be effective. It can change the expectations 
of the brutal men who might once have anticipated realpolitik to ensure 
their impunity. In 1996, Ieng Sary, the Foreign Minister for the Khmer 
Rouge regime, defected from the rump of the Khmer Rouge still fighting 
the democratic government in Cambodia. For this cooperation, he was 
rewarded with a royal pardon for any past crimes. In 1997, the Cambodian
government asked for UN assistance in bringing to justice the Khmer 
Rouge criminals. Finally, in the summer of 2007, the tribunal began 
issuing warrants to arrest those it wished to try. Setting aside earlier 
amnesties as inadequate defence against charges of crimes against humanity,
the tribunal issued and executed a warrant for the arrest of Ieng Sary on 
12 November 2007.
In 1954, speaking to leading American politicians, Churchill popularised
the aphorism: ‘to jaw jaw is always better than to war war’ (Weidhorn © 2008 The Author Geography Compass 2/5 (2008): 1599–1620, 10.1111/j.1749-8198.2008.00125.x
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he would be right today, too. The current government of the USA has acted
as if diplomacy were a sign of weakness. In December 2003, the US Vice 
President, Richard Cheney, allegedly aborted the six-nation anti-nuclear 
discussions with North Korea by insisting to senior American State 
Department negotiators who were considering a Chinese draft agreement: 
‘we don’t negotiate with evil; we defeat it’ (McDonald 2003). Yet, mired 
in Iraq, US threats against countries acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities 
sound hollow. Force did not prevail. In October 2006, North Korea 
claimed to have completed an underground nuclear weapons test. Within 
a week, the UN Security Council imposed sanctions. In January 2007, 
the six-nation negotiations began again in Beijing. In February, a draft 
agreement was reached, and in April the USA released North Korean 
funds frozen in a US bank. The six-nation agreement was signed at the 
end of September 2007 (Cable News Network 2007). It took nearly 4 
years to get back to what Cheney had thrown away. The US gains in 
moral authority to the extent that it pursues multilateral agreements and 
can show that its actions reinforce global human rights. Far from force 
being the only effective power in global relations, it is easily bankrupted 
in the absence of the sort of ‘soft power’ (Nye 2004) best cultivated 
through good example and international institutions.
Conclusion
In a very insightful review, Mamadouh (1998) has written of neoclassical 
geopolitics with its geo-strategic emphasis on the national security interests
of distinct and hostile states. Realist international relations theory is almost 
identical. Both sets of writers strike a tragic pose, regretting the geo-
strategies of force they must perforce propose for a world that can exist in
no other fashion. They naturalise international anarchy. Mamadouh (1998,
242) recognises that the same statism is taken up by many writers claiming, 
rather, to be critical of geopolitics, producing discourses of ‘[n]on-
geopolitics [. . .] the study of the spatial distribution of power between 
states’. Ó Tuathail (1987, 197) identifies the failure of imagination produced
by non-geopolitics’ naïve and empiricist treatment of the state system: ‘the 
state is normalized as a natural unit of political organization with identifiable
interests and objectives (raison d’etat).’ One way of developing beyond 
classical geopolitics (the 19th-century Social Darwinists), neoclassical 
geopolitics and non-geopolitics, is, as Mamadouh argues, to take up the 
deconstructive work that Ó Tuathail (1996) has developed as critical 
geopolitics. A series of scholars have highlighted the political assumptions 
structuring the concepts of almost all geopolitical writings. Flint (2005b, 
5) registers a certain frustration when he offers his recent edited collection 
as ‘not another example of critical geopolitics’, of deconstruction, but 
rather as a set of ‘constructions of theoretically derived geographies that © 2008 The Author Geography Compass 2/5 (2008): 1599–1620, 10.1111/j.1749-8198.2008.00125.x
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Flint identifies some of the themes I raise. He writes of avoiding the 
‘territorial trap of considering sovereign states as the only political territory
worthy of investigation’ (Flint 2005b, 6) and he notes that peace is ‘not only
the absence of war, but also the possibility of maximizing human potential’
(Flint 2005b, 7). His own article on the ‘Dynamic metageographies of 
terrorism’ (Flint 2005c) tries to problematise the relations between terrorists
and states before concluding that states ‘frame both the actions and the 
goals of religious terrorists’ whereas he says nothing at all about ‘human 
potential’. We need, I think, to think systematically outside the framework 
of realist international relations, of classical, neoclassical and non-geopolitics,
if we are to capitalise on the potential insights of critical geopolitics. This 
article suggests that if we try to do this in a systematic manner we can 
identify a range of non-force relations and of non-states on which we 
need to turn our attention. We should not remain enchained to bellicose 
statism, even critically. There is a more peaceful world to win.
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